Setting Boundaries: Can International Society Exclude “Rogue States”?1

ELIZABETH N. SAUNDERS

Department of Political Science, Yale University

This essay addresses a prominent post-Cold War issue to which political scientists have paid relatively little attention: the status of so-called rogue states in international politics. The war in Iraq crystallized transatlantic disagreement over whether “rogue states” exist and how they should be treated, but the debate raged throughout the 1990s. This essay brings international relations theory to bear on the issue of “rogue states,” but it does so with a theoretical twist. It argues that we must first identify the entity from which these states are allegedly excluded as well as who gets to set the membership criteria. If we stipulate that the international system includes all states, then international society can be defined according to various shared ideas and many realizations of international society are possible. Powerful states may try to act as “norm entrepreneurs,” promoting their ideas as the basis of international society. But states, including great powers, may genuinely disagree over the basis and boundaries of this society. It is thus vital not only to take both power and shared ideas seriously, but also to describe the origins and limits of shared ideas. The limits to shared ideas can be termed “bounded inter-subjectivity.” This essay uses the debate over “rogue states” and the transatlantic crisis over confronting Iraq to underscore these theoretical issues.

In the 1990s, the term “rogue state” became fashionable in US foreign policy discourse. The United States government bestowed the “rogue state” label on countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea. The most commonly invoked criteria for “rogue” status were state support for terrorism and the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time, many traditional US allies, especially members of the European Union, consistently rejected the “rogue state” label and stronger incarnations such as the “axis of evil.” In 1995, a former French ambassador to Turkey and Tunisia, Eric Rouleau (1995:59), asserted that the “notion that there are rogue states . . . has no equivalent in the French political vocabulary.” The diplomatic crisis surrounding the war in Iraq, however, crystallized the dispute over “rogue states” and how to confront them.

1For helpful comments and advice, the author thanks Rafaela Dancygier, Keith Darden, Lilach Gilady, Daniel Hopkins, Stephen Kosack, Bruce Russett, Tom Saunders, Jeremy Shapiro, Philip Towle, Stephen Watts, the anonymous reviewers, and the editors as well as participants in the Yale World Politics Workshop, April 2003, where an earlier version of this essay was presented. The author is also grateful to the National Science Foundation for the support of a Graduate Research Fellowship and the Brookings Institution for a Brookings Research Fellowship.
Despite its persistence at the forefront of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, the international relations literature has paid relatively little attention to the “rogue state” debate. This oversight is surprising given questions surrounding “rogue states” that should be interesting to political scientists and policymakers alike. The concept of a “rogue state” and the controversy it has provoked raise two puzzles for international relations theory. The first concerns the “rogues” themselves: Is there such a thing as a “rogue state,” that is, a state that lies outside the bounds of “normal” international relations? Or is it simply a new label for the enemies of great powers? The second puzzle stems from European resistance to the idea that “rogue states” exist at all. Who gets to decide whether “rogue states” exist and, if they do, which states qualify? How can we explain the label’s persistence in the face of European opposition? Can any state with sufficient power use this language effectively? To what extent must states agree on common criteria for “rogue states”? Can reasonable states, including great powers, disagree over the definition and boundaries of international society? Such contestation is not unique to the post-September 11 period, but has been an important feature of the transatlantic disagreement about “rogue states” since the end of the Cold War (on the continuity of transatlantic tensions, see Lundestad 2003; Gordon and Shapiro 2004:chapter 1).

To answer these questions, this essay brings international relations theory to bear on the “rogue state” debate, but with a theoretical twist: it examines the mirror image of the “rogue state” issue. That is, the essay aims to identify the entity from which these states have allegedly been cast out and who gets to set the membership criteria. One reason that the “rogue state” issue is so difficult to pin down is its slippery nature as a category, despite the universal standards that it implies. Most writing on rogue states hones in on the behavior of “rogues,” on inconsistencies between criteria for designating “rogues” and the actual “rogue state” list, or on how best to deal with “rogues” (Klare 1995; Tanter 1998; Rubin 1999; Hoyt 2000; Litwak 2000, 2001; Henriksen 2001; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003, 2005).

Instead, the present essay focuses on exclusion from what has variously been called the “international system,” “international society,” “international community,” and even the “family of nations.” These terms are frequently but imprecisely employed in the political science literature (Johnston 2003:8). Is there such a thing as international society, distinct from the international system and, if so, does the society have boundaries? Are those boundaries changeable and, if so, who has the right to change them? What if the basis of international society is contested? Can international society be exclusionary?

To answer these questions, this essay uses the debate over the designation of “rogue state” as an analytical lens to assess the ability of international relations theory to accommodate disagreement over the basis and boundaries of international society. Accordingly, the essay will examine the “rogue state” label and the larger issue of defining international society through the prisms of three theoretical approaches: realism, social constructivism (along with the English School), and liberalism. In framing the problem in terms of exclusion from the group of “normal” states, we will ask three basic questions of each theory:

1. What is the character of the international system; do subsets of states exist that may be thought of as an international society?
2. If international society exists, can it be exclusionary?
3. If so, what states or entities are capable of doing the excluding?

This essay, thus, focuses on how states attempt to define international society and use exclusionary rhetoric rather than advancing a specific set of hypotheses about “rogue” behavior or how to address “rogues” (for studies that do explore the effectiveness of strategies such as sanctions or engagement, see Blanchard, Mansfield, and Ripsman 1999–2000; Drezner 1999; Haass and O’Sullivan 2000).
The central claims of the present essay are that we can think of an international society, defined according to shared ideas, as a subset of the international system; that many such subsets are possible; that states, including great powers, may disagree about which set of ideas should define international society; and that power is an important determinant of which set of ideas is selected as the basis for international society. Thus, a theoretical framework that can account for such disagreement must take both power and shared ideas seriously. But it must also account for the limits on how far ideas are shared, and thus it must address variation in state preferences and behavior within the international system as a whole. As argued below, the theories that are examined take as given a minimal definition of the international system: that it encompasses all states. They disagree, however, on whether international societies exist as subsets within this system. In building a framework, the two most important contributions from these theories come from constructivism’s focus on shared ideas and from liberalism’s emphasis on variation in state-level factors and zones of common state behavior, but both theories need to explore the role of power more thoroughly.

Within the international system, one function of power is the ability to define which issues delineate the boundaries of a particular international society—in a sense, the ability to set the international agenda (for a reexamination of the concept of power and its various forms, see Barnett and Duvall 2005). Powerful states—or in the case of a unipolar system, the most powerful state—have the ability to put forward new ideas, to define (or redefine) international society, and to exclude those states that do not comply. In the case of the idea of a so-called rogue state, since the end of the Cold War the United States has promoted the notion that “rogues” are states that seek weapons of mass destruction and support terrorism. The ideas that originate within states—rather than simply from the international or structural level—are thus crucial. States—or state elites—can try to act as “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), attempting to get their ideas accepted and shared so that they become the basis of a new norm. If a state has sufficient power, these ideas may become prominent even in the face of resistance by other great powers, and they may ultimately define the criteria for inclusion in international society. Thus, international society can be exclusionary depending on how ideas are selected, promoted, received, and shared.

This conception of international society implies that any theoretical framework must include prominent roles for both state-level factors, including power, and ideas that shape the particular form that international society might take. The “rogue state” phenomenon highlights an important shortcoming of both structural realism and social constructivism: the need to account for the origins and limits of ideas, even the ideas emanating from powerful states. Despite their differences, both structural realist and social constructivist theories emphasize the constraints and homogenizing effects of structure rather than state-level variation in the purposes to which states put their power. Realism misses variation in the ends states pursue; social constructivism misses the crucial role of power in selecting whose ends make it to the top of the international agenda (on this point, see also Barnett and Duvall 2005:41). Although some realists and constructivists have begun to correct the problems in structural approaches by examining the nature of states and domestic politics, more work needs to be done. Constructivists and scholars of international legitimacy have persuasively argued that smaller states (Hurd 2005) and nonstate actors such as international organizations (Finnemore 1996) or “activists beyond borders” (Keck and Sikkink 1998) significantly influence international politics, but theory should pay greater attention to the empirical reality that great powers are important sources and sponsors of ideas and norms. Yet, even powerful states may not be able to persuade or impose their ideas on all states, so theory must address the limits on how far those ideas actually spread. The limits on the extent to which ideas can be shared can be termed “bounded intersubjectivity.”
This essay will proceed as follows: (1) present the history of the “rogue state” debate, making the case for recasting the debate in terms of exclusion from international politics; (2) evaluate how realism, social constructivism (and the closely related English School), and liberalism contribute to our understanding of the debate over “rogues” and the competing bases of international society; and (3) conclude with a discussion of how a synthesis of power, shared ideas, and variation in state preferences and behavior can provide an agenda for future research, building on the idea of the state as “norm entrepreneur.” In the process, it is the intent of the author to demonstrate that an approach that combines constructivist insights to the role of ideas within states with the state-level variation found in liberalism is a fruitful area of future research. Throughout the theoretical sections, the essay will use the debate over “rogue states” and the transatlantic crisis over how to confront Iraq to underscore theoretical issues. Although the Iraq crisis has interesting connections to the “rogue state” question, it is important to keep in mind that the concept of a “rogue state” long predates the George W. Bush administration and was, in fact, forcefully employed by the Clinton administration. Beyond the Iraq war, the recent reemergence of the Iranian nuclear issue demonstrates the enduring relevance of the problem. This longevity is a useful starting point to explore the idea of “rogue states.”

What Is a “Rogue State” and Does It Matter?

Origins of the Term within the United States

Though aspects of the “rogue state” designation can be traced to the Cold War period, the concept of a “rogue state” as a locus of major threats emerged as a prominent feature of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The most commonly invoked criteria for defining “rogues” are state support for terrorism and attempts to obtain WMD, though during the Cold War these two criteria were not merged into one designation of threatening states. Robert Litwak (2000:53) locates the origins of the “rogue state” idea in the Reagan administration, in the creation of the State Department’s official list of countries that sponsored terrorism in accordance with the Export Administration Act of 1979. During the Cold War, however, pursuit of WMD was not a criterion for exclusion. In the 1970s, some political scientists (Betts 1977; Harkavy 1981) referred to states such as Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, and South Korea that sought nuclear weapons as “pariah states.” Except for South Africa, these states were US allies surrounded by hostile states. In this period, the term “pariah” described a condition certain disparate states found themselves in rather than an active policy designating them as outcasts.

Although it appears in the Congressional Record as early as 1987, when Representative Pete Stark called Iran a “rogue,” it was not until the post-Cold War era that the “rogue state” label gained widespread currency within the United States. According to Michael Klare (1995:chapters 1–2), the idea of “rogues” as a class of threats arose in the post-Cold War search for a new strategic vision. It was cemented in a central place on the policy agenda in the wake of the first Gulf War among members of the George H.W. Bush administration. According to this view, “rogues” provided a way to justify post-Cold War defense budgets by filling in what Senator Sam Nunn (quoted in Klare 1995:14) called a “threat blank.” The “rogue state” designation became official policy during the Clinton administration. In 1994, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake (1994:45) referred in a Foreign Affairs article to “recalcitrant,” “outlaw,” and “backlash” states. “Rogue” quickly became the adjective of choice. As Figure 1 illustrates, the term appeared only once in the Congressional Record in 1987, but it peaked at 77 mentions in 1999. In June 2000, however, the US State Department formally changed its designation from “rogue states” to “states of concern” because, as State Department spokesman
Richard Boucher (2000) put it, “a single description, one size fits all, doesn’t really fit any more.” The incoming Bush administration quickly returned to the “rogue state” label (see, for example, Vice President Cheney quoted in Lemann 2001:60). After September 11, President Bush pushed the language even further, designating Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an “axis of evil.”

Do all these shifts in terminology matter? On one level, they do (Litwak 2001). The 2000 shift from “rogue states” to “states of concern” was a deliberate attempt by the Clinton administration to tone down its rhetoric at a time when relations with Iran and North Korea seemed relatively promising. Furthermore, the list of “rogues” did contain inconsistencies, notably in states that did not make the list such as Pakistan, a WMD proliferator that had, it is now apparent, ties to many of the other “rogues” (Sanger and Broad 2004). Yet, on another level, the various incarnations of the “rogue state” label do reflect a common theme that transcends semantics. As Litwak (2000:7) notes, with the exception of Cuba “the designation is rooted in tangible external behavior of concern.” The element of externally threatening behavior is a constant feature of all the “rogue state” variants.

Thus, despite the changes in rhetoric since the end of the Cold War, there has been remarkable agreement within the United States government about the nature of new threats. As Jacques Hymans (2004:33, emphasis in original) points out in an analysis of the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy, even though many foreign policy elites criticized the Strategy’s doctrine of preemptive war, “overwhelmingly these elites—even political opponents of the Bush administration—did not criticize the threat assessment that underlies the doctrine.” He (Hymans 2004:33) argues that there was “broad-based agreement about the nature of the contemporary threat environment” because “the mainstream opposition ... had independently developed the same assessment as the Bush Administration.” Indeed, there are similarities between the Clinton administration’s 1996 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement and the 2002 Bush Strategy, both of which identified “rogue states” as a central locus of threats (Hymans 2004:36; see also Jervis 2003 for an analysis of the Bush Doctrine as the elements of the 2002 Bush Strategy have become known). Aside from a few tentative overtures (notably the 1994 “Agreed Framework” between the United States and North Korea to halt the North Korean nuclear program, and a brief softening of tensions with Iran in the late-1990s), overall US policy sought to contain “rogues” through sanctions and...
diplomatic isolation designed to keep them outside the boundaries of “normal” international politics.

**Transatlantic Disagreement**

Many European countries, however, begged to differ (Haass 1999; Gordon and Shapiro 2004:38–44). In the mid-1990s, when the transatlantic debate on how to deal with Iraq (and other “rogues”) centered on whether sanctions or cautious engagement was the best policy, several European countries actively pursued links with “rogues” (Tanter 1998; Haass and O’Sullivan 2000). In Iraq, France continually criticized the Anglo-US embargo and in 2000, together with Russia, deliberately broke the ban on flights into Iraq without waiting for UN authorization in what a *Le Monde* article (Naïm 2000) described as the politics of “des petits faits accomplis” (see also Hurd 2005 for a discussion of the erosion of the sanctions regime against Libya through similar violations, albeit from mostly smaller states). In the Iranian case, the European Union (EU) took a more conciliatory approach to Iran and strongly resisted US pressure for containment.

Much of Europe saw the US tendency toward coercion as unduly harsh (see, for example, Rudolf 1999:86). In response, some US observers and officials criticized the European Union’s preference for engagement as mere cover for continuing lucrative trading with countries like Iran. Whatever the motives behind European disagreement, the United States government remained frustrated. As Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat (1997) put it in Congressional testimony, “some of our allies do not seem to share our sense of urgency in confronting Iran’s dangerous behavior and convincing the new Iranian government of the need for change.” In 1996, US frustration with the European Union boiled over when the US Congress passed two controversial pieces of legislation, the Helms-Burton Act and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, notable for their provisions allowing sanctions against foreign investors dealing with Cuba, Iran, or Libya. These laws caused a major trade dispute between the United States and the European Union, though eventually President Clinton waived the provisions on third-country penalties. The controversy highlighted not only the transatlantic tensions but also the limits, even before September 11, on the ability of the United States to impose its ideas about how to deal with “rogues.” The 2004 agreement between Iran and Britain, France, and Germany, under which Iran agreed to suspend its nuclear program in return for negotiations on trade, returned the sanctions versus engagement debate to the fore. The debate remains salient as European powers struggle to keep Iran committed to the agreement.

How can we account for this disagreement among the transatlantic allies? Before a club can exclude members, it must have membership criteria for those that are allowed in and some sort of process for setting those criteria, even if they are only prohibitions rather than active requirements. Reversing the “rogue state” question gives us better analytical leverage over the problem. If we stipulate that the “international system” encompasses all states, do subsets exist? Popularly known as the “international community” or the “family of nations,” the term “international society” is favored by academics, particularly those writing in the English School (Butterfield and Wight 1966; Bull 1977; Buzan 1993) or constructivist vein (Finne-more 1996), to indicate states with more in common than simply their existence. But as confusion and disagreement about “rogue states” in the 1990s indicates, the boundaries of “international society” are not fixed. Thinking in terms of different international societies based on issues such as terrorism or WMD proliferation allows for different criteria for exclusion from such international societies as well as for disagreement about whom to exclude. Although terrorism and WMD proliferation are two prominent and relatively enduring criteria, there are other plausible possibilities, such as democratic governance or respect for human rights.
Finally, posing the problem as one of exclusion more readily segues into the issue of who has the ability to define the terms of exclusion, thus putting the “rogue state” issue into a broader theoretical and geopolitical context and addressing the second puzzle concerning transatlantic disagreement. The Iraq crisis in 2003 was the final stage in a long dispute over threats and how to confront them, highlighting the importance of both power and ideas. Throughout the 1990s, the United States sought to isolate “rogues” through sanctions and occasionally military force, whereas many European Union countries sought to engage the very same “rogues.” The “rogue state” debate is not just about what words US policymakers use, but about who has the ability to shape the international agenda and how they choose to shape it.

Thus, even though the semantic debates, both domestic and transatlantic, are interesting, the words themselves are less important than the contested boundaries of international politics that they suggest. The term “rogue state” and its variants are undeniably rhetorical devices, and they are perhaps even intended to be sloppy or vague, but real debates lie behind them. As the following discussion will demonstrate, international relations theory has much to say about whether boundaries exist and who has the right to shape them.

**International Relations Theory and “Rogue States”**

The following sections will examine “rogue states” and the concept of international society from different theoretical perspectives, keeping in mind the three questions posed earlier in the introduction regarding the existence and nature of such a society.

**Realism**

The identification of a new class of threats arising from “rogue states” would seem to be ripe for analysis from a realist perspective. Indeed, the two criteria associated with the “rogue” label, WMD proliferation and support for terrorism, concern externally threatening behavior. Does realism shed useful light on this issue?

Somewhat surprisingly, the answer is largely no. Realism comes in several varieties, each of which makes slightly different assumptions about state behavior. Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau (see Morgenthau and Thompson 1985) focus on the power-seeking aspects of human nature; neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz (1979) focus on the fear induced by the anarchic nature of international relations; offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer (2001) emphasize how maximizing power through calculated aggression makes states more secure in an anarchic world; and defensive realists such as Jack Snyder (1991) stress how states try to maintain the existing balance of power. (For a review of realist approaches, see Brooks 1997.) These theories also vary in the extent to which they emphasize the constraining effects of the structure of the international system rather than domestic or individual-level considerations. Despite their differences, most realists agree on the inherently anarchic and conflictual nature of international relations and on the importance of power, defined in terms of material capabilities. They also emphasize great power competition, again in terms of material power, rather than threats from smaller powers or competition over normative or ideational issues. Existing realist arguments have little to say about “rogues” as sources of threat and as states that lie outside an international society or, for that matter, about how to resolve conflicts over the basis of international society.

A particularly stark picture emerges from neorealism, which focuses on the structure of the international system. According to Kenneth Waltz (1979:97), the anarchic nature of the international system constrains all states to behave in the same way—states are “functionally undifferentiated” and are “distinguished
primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks.” Given that the international system is anarchic, states must act according to the principle of “self-help.” As Stephen Brooks (1997:450) has put it, in neorealist theory “states are shaped by the mere possibility of conflict.” Given that all states behave according to the same logic of self-help and that all states must be viewed with suspicion, there is either no such thing as a “rogue state” or, put differently, all states are potential “rogues.” There is no role for shared ideas, rules, or norms in this model; anarchy accounts for the character of the system. For Waltz, there is no higher form of international organization beyond the system and, therefore, no such thing as international society. The question of whether the United States, as the dominant state in the system, gets to define international society is largely irrelevant for Waltz (2000), who continued to predict a decade after the Cold War ended that unipolarity would eventually give way to a balance of power and multipolarity.

Those realists, like Waltz, who focus on the structure of the international system and the distribution of material power within it, might reasonably ask if the shift in US policy toward “rogue states” is the product of the end of the Cold War. During the 1990s, however, as the “rogue state” debate took a prominent place on the policy agenda, much of the debate going on among realists centered on unipolarity and whether another great power or coalition would emerge to balance US hegemony (see, among others, Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993; Wohlforth 1999). Of course, “rogues” did not have a major place on the research agenda of other mainstream theories either, and realists did weigh in once the invasion of Iraq became the center of debate (Mearsheimer and Walt 2003a, 2003b; see also Jervis 2003:380–385 for a discussion of how realist arguments relate to the Bush Doctrine). But realists have continued to emphasize great power military competition (Mearsheimer 2001), which makes their approach particularly unsuitable for the question of “rogue states” in the Third World (for an exception, see Lieber 1998). Interestingly, Waltz does not mention “rogue states” at all in his 2000 article, does not refer to Iraq or Iran by name, and only mentions North Korea twice in passing. He does not discuss terrorism and mentions nuclear proliferation largely in the context of Japan.

On the question of defining an international society, some versions of realism, including pre-Waltzian variants, provide a richer model that leaves room for other forms of organization within anarchy. Hans Morgenthau’s classical realism is perhaps best known for its emphasis on power, but much of the second half of his landmark study explores limitations on power through “morality, mores, and law,” which can “delimit, regulate, and civilize the struggle for power among nations” (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985:247) and the development of a “world community” that can mitigate conflict (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: chapter 30). In his classic study of the nineteenth-century Congress system, A World Restored, Henry Kissinger (1964) details how the great powers constructed a “legitimate” international order after 1815. Robert Gilpin (1981:27–34) also explores elements of the international system, including the “form of control” that constrains behavior, which may stem from hegemonic dominance, and includes a “set of rights and rules that govern or at least influence the interactions among states.” Gilpin (1981:35) finds that “in part, rights and rules rest on common values and interests and are generated by cooperative action among states.”

Other recent versions of realism, which accept Waltz’s (1986:329) assertion that his emphasis on structure explains “a small number of big and important things” such as the superior stability of bipolar in contrast with multipolar systems, have built on his model by exploring its implications for foreign policy. Such scholars focus on whether states balance against threats (Walt 1987), bandwagon with the stronger side to gain material profit (Schweller 1994), or “pass the buck,” effectively
free-riding on allies’ ability to confront threats (Christensen and Snyder 1990). Some of these accounts eschew Waltz’s pure structuralism, taking domestic politics into account to explain imperatives or constraints on state action (see, for example, Snyder 1991; Christensen 1996; Schweller 1998). These efforts usually focus on great power dynamics in the face of threats from other great powers rather than threats from smaller but potentially dangerous “rogues.” Stephen Walt’s (1987) theory of threat balancing is to some extent an exception because he tests his argument in the Middle East. But his argument is less useful for explaining differing perceptions of the threat from “rogues” between, for example, the United States and Europe.

But these approaches have thus far remained within the logic of balancing or bandwagoning, and usually relegate the role of beliefs and ideas to an artifact or tool of power. Even though classical realists and realist scholars who focus on hegemony, such as Gilpin (1981), have explored alternative forms of order, most mainstream realists, writing in the wake of Waltz (1979), continue to study great power material competition and thus do not address competition over how to define an international society. As a result, realism does not provide particularly interesting answers to the three questions posed in the introduction. Indeed, realism’s answers would be: the international system is all encompassing; international society exists only in minimal form if at all; and the question of exclusion is irrelevant. This lacuna is unfortunate because, as will be argued below, theoretical approaches that emphasize ideas too often ignore the role of power and the question of who gets to define international society.

And, as we have seen, US policymakers in the 1990s seem to have reached consensus about the importance of “rogues.” As for the American and European disagreement over dealing with “rogues” or confronting Iraq, neither structure nor material interests alone adequately capture the variation in approaches. It is true that European countries had commercial and financial interests in pre-war Iraq, though Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro (2004:77–78) note that these interests were very small for both France and Germany. Moreover, these countries contributed to the 1991 Gulf War and the war in Afghanistan and arguably could have done quite well materially in the reconstruction of Iraq by following Randall Schweller’s (1994) notion of “bandwagoning for profit.” Indeed, Gordon and Shapiro (2004:78) argue that “if commercial interests and cynicism were really the main factors driving policy, the best strategy for France and Germany would have been to strongly back the US threat of force, join the coalition, and insist on a share of the spoils.”

European countries have also been recent targets of terrorism and are physically closer to Iraq, so that one might well have expected them to fear an Iraqi WMD capability and WMD proliferation generally. Though they are largely concerned with threats from great powers, realists such as Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder (1990) might argue that European leaders “passed the buck,” leaving the United States to act (see also Jervis 2003:384). But this explanation does not account for the prolonged European opposition to the very idea of a “rogue state” or to the efforts by France and Germany to oppose the US invasion into Iraq, given that presumably free-riders would still like to see their protectors succeed. Some Europeans may also be seeking to balance or constrain US hegemony, whereas Britain bandwagon, perhaps due to the “special relationship” between the United States and Britain or Tony Blair’s personal conviction that British interests lie with the transatlantic partnership (Jervis 2003:384–386). But even though they may not have been willing to participate actively in action against Iraq, Europeans arguably have a long-term interest in strong antiterrorism and counterproliferation policies. Their opposition to “rogue state” rhetoric and to containment of so-called rogues—opposition that existed long before September 11—remains somewhat puzzling.
Even Robert Kagan (2003:3, 53), who has emphasized the importance of the power gap between the United States and Europe in explaining why “on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus,” concludes that the full explanation for the current schism “lies somewhere in the realm of ideology, in European attitudes not just toward defense spending but toward power itself.” For Kagan, ideas about how power should be used and threats should be met are just as important as actual power. Kagan (2003:53) asserts that Europeans have turned away from the use of power in the wake of two bloody wars, but they also continue to rely on the United States to protect their “postmodern paradise” (see also Gordon and Shapiro 2004:57–58). As a result, Europeans do not perceive “rogue states” to be urgent priorities. When Europeans do address the issue, however, they prefer to use indirect means and strategies of engagement rather than confrontation. Although power is an important consideration in explaining the debate over “rogue states,” ideas are necessary to provide the context in which states use their power.

The English School and Social Constructivism

In searching for an alternative theoretical framework to illuminate the “rogue state” issue, approaches such as the English School—which pushes realism to explore whether there could be an international society even amid anarchy—or social constructivism—which emphasizes the role of shared ideas in shaping state interests—would seem to be promising alternatives. But both approaches have limitations. The English School has tended to emphasize universal principles such as sovereignty and diplomatic recognition as the basis for order, leaving debates over other norms unexplored. The dominant strands of constructivist theorizing to date suffer from two drawbacks. First, systemic (or “holistic”) constructivism, exemplified by the work of Alexander Wendt (1992, 1999), shows a remarkable similarity to structural realism in that it focuses on systemic or social constraints and, thus, is unable to account for subsets or variation within the system. Second, more recent constructivist work has reemphasized how agents shape structure, but this work has thus far tended to examine international or nonstate actors rather than states. This section explores how social constructivism and the closely related English School view the question of international society, arguing that such approaches are promising but, as we shall see, still need to go further in exploring the limits of shared ideas and the role of power.

The English School. One of constructivism’s intellectual precursors is the English School (or Grotian tradition) of international relations, which was instrumental in developing the concept of international society. Though the English School was already flourishing in the first half of the Cold War (as the essays in Butterfield and Wight 1966 make clear), it is closely identified with the work of Hedley Bull and his 1977 book *The Anarchical Society*. Like realists, Bull sees anarchy as the underlying feature of any international system, which, in turn, encompasses all states. But within this international system, a subset may form what Bull (1977:16–18) explicitly calls an international society. This society is based on common interests and values such as maintaining sovereignty, the keeping of promises through treaties, peace (a subordinate goal), or the limiting of violence (possibly by limiting war to “just” causes). The concept of international society suggests that there exists an important form of order within the international system and goes beyond Waltz. Bull (1977:196) also assigns a central role to great powers, which “assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole.”

But Bull’s argument (1977:61) emphasizes universal principles (such as respect for sovereignty) that encompass all states, so that international society is “today a
political fabric that embraces the whole of mankind.” These universal principles and an all-inclusive scope are at odds with the possibility of exclusion. Other English School scholars are more explicit in defining the origins and potential limits of international society, relying on cultural explanations or, like Bull, a minimal interpretation of international society based on sovereignty. Martin Wight (1977:114) explicitly inquires into the “geographical limits” and the “boundaries” of the international system. He puts a particular emphasis on the cultural origins and limits of what he calls the “states-system,” with “two concentric circles, European and universal” (Wight 1977:118). More recently, Barry Buzan (1993:343) has rejected this cultural basis for international society, arguing instead that international society emerges functionally, from mechanisms such as the exchange of ambassadors and the making of agreements that states use to interact regularly. This argument still leaves the “values of security, contract, and property rights” as the basis of a minimal international society, just as they are for Bull; the question of how debates over the content of international society might arise or be resolved is not discussed (Buzan 1993:343).

One interesting question that arises from the English School’s notion of international society is whether there can be multiple international societies, possibly existing at the same time. The tendency within the English School to focus on basic norms of sovereignty and diplomatic interaction leaves this question only partly answered. Bull (1977:41) notes that during the Cold War “the United States and the Soviet Union were inclined to speak of each other as heretics or outcasts beyond the pale,” but they still maintained diplomatic relations. This vision still rests on basic, fundamental values that can survive even in periods of superpower hostility. It does not explore contestation over other values.

Buzan (1993:337) goes much further, arguing explicitly that it is “possible for more than one international or ‘world’ society to coexist or for one part of the system to have an international society while other parts do not.” There may also be significant variation in the depth and extent of shared values within the system. He (Buzan 1993:349) also notes that in the post-Cold War era:

[a] small number of pariah states are partially excluded by the refusal of many others to accord them diplomatic recognition. A few states such as North Korea and Myanmar (Burma) place themselves on the outer fringes of international society by accepting little more than the basics of diplomatic recognition and exchange.

Writing before the “rogue state” debate fully emerged, Buzan does not deal with the contestation over the definition of international society that took place in the 1990s. Ultimately, he falls back on the mutual recognition of sovereignty as “the defining boundary between international system and society” (Buzan 1993:345). Thus, he still seeks to explain the ever-present underpinnings of state interaction rather than exploring what happens when states disagree about those underpinnings or have alternative visions of international society.

Although Bull and others in the English School do inject norms, ideas, and notions of order into realist theory, the concept of international disagreement over the definition and criteria for membership in international society is difficult to reconcile with universal norms and ideas. Their vision of international society, defined by recognition of sovereignty and diplomacy, provides little guidance beyond these basic issues (though for a more recent application of Bull’s theory to the Iraq war that touches briefly on transatlantic disagreement over the management of international security, see Press-Barnathan 2004:especially 203–205). The United States has not had diplomatic relations with North Korea since the end of the Korean War nor with Iran since 1980. But several European countries have established diplomatic relations with North Korea since 2000 (including Britain and Germany, but not France). Most European states have diplomatic relations with
Iran, though there have been some interruptions (such as the British protest over the Iranian fatwa on the author Salman Rushdie). How do we interpret this variation?

Social Constructivism. Constructivist approaches to international relations theory are equipped to tackle a wider variety of potential norms and ideas. Constructivists take aim at realism's assumptions of fixed state interests and self-help logic. A major starting point for constructivist theories is that actors do not view the world objectively but instead make decisions on the basis of shared, or intersubjective, ideas that become the basis for social order (for reviews of constructivist studies, see Adler 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). Social constructivists have set out to demonstrate that such intersubjective ideas can act as social norms that constrain the self-help behavior of states, even when security issues are involved or during wartime (see, among others, Price and Tannenwald 1996; Legro 1997). Norms and ideas may also define (or redefine) state interests, as Martha Finnemore’s (1996) argument about the role of international organizations in defining state preferences illustrates (see also Klotz 1995, Finnemore 2003).

Social constructivist arguments often take the form of “constitutive” explanations, “which characterize systems of beliefs and practices that in effect create or define social objects and actors” (Fearon and Wendt 2002:65; see also Ruggie 1998:22–25). John Ruggie’s (1998:188) work on the emergence of sovereignty as an organizing principle, or the designation of “the right to act as a constitutive unit of the new political order,” is a prominent example that echoes the English School’s emphasis on sovereignty as the basis of international society (though see Krasner 1999 for an argument against the universality of the post-Westphalian sovereignty norm). Finnemore (2003:14-15) also explicitly considers her argument about the changing purpose of military intervention to be constitutive.

But in seeking to demonstrate the empirical reality that social norms exert an influence on state behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001:397), social constructivists have not yet paid sufficient attention to variation in state behavior and motivations or to what role power might play in selecting among competing constitutive principles (though as discussed below, some of Ruggie’s work is an exception). Furthermore, even though constructivists have drawn attention to the “agent-structure” debate (Wendt 1987), arguing that social structure must be considered alongside the characteristics of the agents (whether states or individuals) that live within it, in practice they have emphasized structure more than agency (Checkel 1999:85). Although some (see, for example, Finnemore 1996:24–28) have sought to reclaim a role for agency, structure still has the central role in constructivist theorizing.

Perhaps the most prominent social constructivist argument, that made by Alexander Wendt, illustrates how the emphasis on structure leads some versions of constructivism to resemble structural realism. Wendt (1992, 1999) engages Waltz directly and thus aims his argument at the level of the international system. Wendt argues that anarchy does not inevitably produce a competitive international system organized around the self-help principle. The structure of the social world and the interactions that result from it confer identities and interests on actors—that is, states—and those identities and interests are changeable. The structure, “once constructed … confronts each of its members as an objective social fact that reinforces certain behaviors and discourages others” (Wendt 1992:411). Wendt (1999:chapter 6) characterizes the three possible realizations of anarchy as Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, arguing that the international system can move among all three. Shared ideas can lead to a Hobbesian culture based on enmity just as logically as they can lead to a Lockean culture based on rivalry within a basic respect for sovereignty or a Kantian culture based on friendship and collective security. As the title of Wendt’s 1992 article argued, “anarchy is what states make of it.”
But where does this structure come from? Wendt does not answer this question adequately. He (Wendt 1992:399) contends that structures and agents are “mutually constitutive,” but he does not explore how agents might seek to change structure or how a state might “make” something of anarchy. Notably, Wendt has no special characterization of international society because he does not explore the issue of whether all states share the ideas that define the international system. This omission, viewed in light of what he does argue, implies that structure constrains all states. Even a predatory state and its prey inhabit the same universe of shared ideas. Wendt (1999:266–278) does include a dimension for the “degree of internalization” or the relative depth of shared understandings about the culture that produces international structure. He does not, however, discuss whether there is room for more than one set of ideas. Indeed, his argument does not seem compatible with the notion that there might be contestation over the definition of international society or even two international societies at the same time.

Yet, the essence of the “rogue state” label is that certain states are excluded from international society because that particular society is defined by a specific, but possibly contested, set of shared ideas that are salient in the international system. In assuming that through coercion shared understandings spread throughout the system, Wendt ignores the very real possibility that some states will not internalize an idea at all, even in the face of coercion—that the structure will constrain some actors but not others. Thus “rogue state” policy does not fit into Wendt’s theory and neither does European rejection of the “rogue state” label. Neither the “rogues” themselves nor the Europeans have accepted the US idea that WMD proliferation and support for terrorism should be grounds for exclusion from international society. Furthermore, Wendt’s theory does not adequately address who defines or changes structure. Is there a role for powerful states to make what they want out of anarchy? Part of the puzzle of the “rogue state” issue is addressing who possesses the capacity to define or alter international society and to position the boundaries of intersubjectivity.

Increasingly, constructivists are recognizing that all states do not share the same norms and ideas. Constructivists are also exploring multiple norms or variation in norm adherence or compliance. Jeffrey Checkel (1999:85), for example, notes that “constructivism cannot account for an obvious fact: the same norm will have a dramatic constitutive impact in one state, but fail to do so in others” (see also Finnemore 1996:135; Kowert and Legro 1996:454; Legro 1997; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Johnston 2003:22). But it is also important to distinguish fundamental contestation over the very constitution of an international society from the problem of variation in norm adoption or adherence that some constructivists, such as Checkel, have rightly identified. To date studies usually begin by describing a norm operating at the international level and examine domestic-level variation in compliance with or internalization of the norm. If the idea of “rogue states,” defined in terms of WMD proliferation and support for terrorism, were widely accepted among the great powers, we might then be able to examine variation in adherence among “rogues” and states teetering on “rogue” status or among states that violate punishment regimes for “rogues.” However, the dispute about defining the category itself represents another level of normative disagreement. European countries may believe that WMD proliferation and support for terrorism are dangerous and threatening behaviors, but part of their argument is that engagement is more likely to result in adherence to nonproliferation and antiterrorism goals than a strategy of exclusion from international society. Such contestation suggests the need to address the origins of potentially competing norms as well as the limits on who accepts such norms as constitutive before examining how widespread norm adherence is in the international system as a whole.
Several strands of constructivist theorizing are potentially promising avenues for addressing these issues. The first are arguments about how agents work to build or change norms, with varying degrees of success. Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) important model of norm development highlights the role of “norm entrepreneurs” who seek to create or change norms as well as the process of “strategic social construction” as these entrepreneurs try to achieve their goals. Many constructivists have explored mechanisms triggering norm emergence that involve nonstate actors, often at the international or transnational level. Examples include studies of transnational networks of activists (Keck and Sikkink 1998), experts or “epistemic communities” (Adler and Haas 1992), and international organizations (Finnemore 1996). Recent constructivist accounts have also explored other sources of norms and ideas. Finnemore’s (2003) discussion of how the purpose of intervention changes, for example, includes both collective- and individual-level mechanisms. Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald’s (1996) work on the origins of weapons taboos distinguishes between the transnational origins of the chemical weapons taboo and the origins of the nuclear weapons taboo largely within the United States. In this research, international and nonstate actors form the bulk of the agents of normative change. As Chaim Kaufmann and Robert Pape (1999:642) note, “in principle, none of the elements of transnationalism [or] cosmopolitanism . . . may be essential to constructivist theorizing about international moral action; in practice, however, these elements dominate the existing literature.”

Other studies have located the source of ideas within states and described how these ideas become salient in foreign policy. Emanuel Adler’s (1992) study of the national epistemic community of elites working on arms control within the United States during the Cold War is one domestic-level example. In their study of Britain’s “costly moral action” to stop the Atlantic slave trade, Kaufmann and Pape (1999) argue that both ideas and domestic politics within Britain played a vital role and that the transnational and cosmopolitan ethical concerns often highlighted by constructivists were not relevant. Scholars of strategic culture and of domestic norms and collective state identity have also highlighted domestic-level variation in how states orient their foreign policy and security institutions. Culture and identity may produce constraints on the exercise of state power (Katzenstein 1993; Berger 1996; Katzenstein 1996), or it may shape the way that states produce or use power, even producing forms of “realism” (Johnston 1995; Kier 1997; Nau 2002). Wendt (1994:385-386) himself does suggest a role for domestic identity or norms in defining self-interest in addition to systemic factors. Such arguments illustrate that the process of idea formation may, indeed, be social, as constructivists have argued, but that this social process may operate within one state and then diffuse outward in an “inside-out” process rather than beginning at the transnational level and then influencing states.

Another possibility, still largely unexplored in constructivist accounts, is that states, or state elites, may try to act as norm entrepreneurs. Arguably US policymakers have attempted something along these lines in defining a new class of “rogue states.” Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:893) hint at such a process, noting that “many international norms began as domestic norms and become international through the efforts of entrepreneurs of various kinds.” Most of their examples, however, focus on transnational or nonstate actors. Michael Barnett’s (1998) study of how Arab leaders fought over the norms that govern inter-Arab relations highlights the promise of looking at the state or state elites as a source of norm origination and contestation. The last section of this essay will discuss ways that states might be considered “norm entrepreneurs,” but it will also emphasize that the success of such entrepreneurship is not inevitable and depends crucially on both power and the responses of other states. Here, it is sufficient to note that even though transnational or nonstate actors are certainly important sources of
ideas and change, constructivists have paid less attention to problems of power and state action.

**Bounded Intersubjectivity.** A state-level focus on the origins of norms and ideas is only one aspect of the “rogue state” debate that requires further attention; the other is the limits on how far ideas are shared. One constructivist argument that does combine the role of power with a state-level account of the origins and limits of shared ideas as the basis of social order is John Ruggie’s work on post-World War II international economic regimes. In his essay on “embedded liberalism,” Ruggie (1998:64) elucidates a conception of authority in the international system as the combination of power and “legitimate social purpose.” The social purpose dimension, usually ignored by realists, gives international order its “generative grammar” and its “content” (Ruggie 1998:64). In the postwar international economic compromise, the combination of multilateralism and domestic interventionism “reflected the shared legitimacy of a set of social objectives to which the industrial world had moved unevenly but . . . ‘as a single entity’” (Ruggie 1998:76). By limiting the scope of these social objectives to the “industrial world,” Ruggie describes how other states came to accept these objectives as the new basis for order and implies that shared ideas have boundaries.

The power dimension, usually ignored by constructivists, ensures that the dominant state in the system—the so-called hegemon—will be the driving force in international politics. Thus, as Ruggie argues, the United States was able to define and project its own social purpose within a set of “social objectives” shared by a subset of the international system: the “industrial world.” The multilateral element of the compromise originated in the United States, and Ruggie (1998:73) calls it an “achievement of historic proportions for the United States to win adherence to the principle of multilateralism, particularly in trade.” This acceptance was the result of “the power and perseverance of the United States” (Ruggie 1998:76). In another essay, Ruggie (1998:206–217) also locates the origins of ideas at the elite level by focusing on presidential leadership. His argument, thus, gives a role both to power and to the hegemon’s identity and preferences—in effect, allowing for a state to be a norm entrepreneur. As Ruggie (1998:14, emphasis in original) puts it, “contra neorealism, I suggest that the fact of American hegemony was every bit as important as the fact of American hegemony in shaping the post-World War II international order.”

Ruggie’s argument suggests that theory must attend to both the origins and limits of shared ideas. This limited scope of shared ideas can be thought of as “bounded intersubjectivity.” Although shared ideas can have a powerful effect on behavior, the set of states that share those ideas is often bounded, even when those who hold the idea (or the nature of the idea itself) imply that it should be universal. The term is intended to convey two aspects of “boundedness,” both of which reflect the puzzles surrounding “rogue states.” First, the set of states subscribing to an idea may be bounded because the ideas themselves may be defined in exclusionary terms. Thus, the idea of a “rogue state,” defined in terms of WMD proliferation and support for terrorism, purports to specify standards of behavior that states must subscribe to as a condition of entry into a society. Shared ideas may incorporate the concept of a boundary between those who subscribe and those who do not. This exclusivity may be an inherent and deliberate feature of the shared ideas, a feature similar to defining an “in-group” in relation to an “out-group,” or enemy, in order to increase in-group cohesion. Such deliberate exclusivity is an enduring theme in the sociology of conflict (Simmel 1955:chapter 3), in the literature on nationalism and violence (Brubaker and Laitin

---

*This term is not directly related to Herbert Simon’s (1957) concept of “bounded rationality,” which refers to the limits on human rationality. Simon’s concept refers to the limits on cognitive processes, whereas “bounded intersubjectivity” refers to the boundaries on shared ideas among different actors.*
1998:433–434; Snyder 2000), and in arguments about states or leaders that deliberately define their foreign policy in terms of a distinct enemy or “other”—even to the point of manipulating or exacerbating threats (Wendt 1994; Gagnon 1994–1995; Barnett 1996:408; Christensen 1996). Echoing the notion of the “threat blank,” in this view the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the United States of its “other” and led to “ambiguity in US interests” (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996:60).

Such deliberate exclusivity is not necessary. Those who seek to advance a particular set of ideas may aim them at all states, excluding those who do not subscribe at a given time while leaving open the possibility of letting them back into the fold. This reformist option arguably applies to “rogue states” and to the example of Libya, which is normalizing relations with the great powers. The crucial point here is that there are limits on the size of the group that shares ideas, regardless of whether that group intends to be forever exclusive or to ultimately extend its ideas universally. This facet of boundedness is closely related to arguments about which states subscribe to, comply with, or internalize a given norm.

A second aspect of boundedness, however, arises from the possibility that states—even major powers—may disagree over which ideas, drawn from a larger set, should be salient. This characteristic of boundedness could in principle be compatible with constructivism’s concept of constitutive rules: the particular set of ideas that is constitutive of an international society is not always obvious and could be contested. Power will have an important role to play in determining which set of ideas becomes salient. When we move beyond the minimal specification of international society conceived of by the English School—recognition of sovereignty, respect for diplomatic interaction, and other basic functions—to more complicated norms and rules, it is possible to conceive of states, even within an already identified subgroup, disagreeing over new definitions of, or refinements to, international society. Thus, it is important to understand not only the origins of any ideas that are being considered as a basis for international society but also the distribution of power among the states that might advance those ideas. Some states may voluntarily stay out of the group defined by a set of boundedly intersubjective ideas; others, even major powers, may actively contest the ideas or propose alternatives; still others may have no choice but to reluctantly tolerate or even sign on, perhaps eventually becoming bound by the ideas. It is also interesting to note that including both power and ideas lead to two mechanisms for change in the basis of international society: change in either the distribution of power or in the foundation of the shared ideas within the originating state.

How might this argument bear on “rogue states”? One could argue that the end of the Cold War, like the end of World War II, provided the opportunity for normative or ideational change (on defining order after major wars, see Ikenberry 2001). The United States, as the dominant power, has had to assume a disproportionate burden for enforcing norms in international society and thus has had a disproportionate influence in shaping that society. It has sought to define international society in terms of WMD nonproliferation and the renunciation of terrorism. Given that, in principle, these two security issues affect all states, it is not especially surprising that the United States has aimed this norm at all members of the international system.

Certainly this universal aim does not mean that the norm will, in fact, be accepted by all states, as “rogue state” behavior and European dissent demonstrate. European dissent highlights a crucial difference between the post-World War II international economic consensus described by Ruggie and the US attempt to define “rogues” in the post-Cold War era. As John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan (1990:285) have argued, “hegemonic control emerges when
foreign elites buy into the hegemon’s vision of international order and accept it as their own.” European countries, despite initial resistance, accepted the normative compromise after World War II partly as a result of US sensitivity to European concerns, though the compromise still represented an exercise of US power (Barnett and Duvall 2005:63–64). Europe has been much less accepting of US dominance in the post-Cold War era.

“Rogue states” might be a way to reconceptualize the international society previously defined by the Soviet enemy, though the universalist rhetoric of excluding “rogues” makes such an interpretation less plausible. But even if “rogues” are simply the new “other” for a society previously based on fighting the Soviets, it is important not only to understand how the United States seeks to redefine international society, but also how European resistance may lead to disagreement over such redefinition. Yet, there remains the possibility that if certain key states should decide to promote these norms, they will become a new salient boundary for international society, with states that fail to comply ostracized as “rogues.”

The vociferous European criticism of what has been perceived as Bush unilateralism perhaps may reflect the degree to which Europe has come to expect multilateral behavior from the United States, though in the Clinton years most European countries often declined to help or even hindered multilateral efforts to isolate “rogues.” As the most powerful state in the system, however, the United States can afford to choose an unpopular principle and stand alone, hoping to persuade others to adopt it. Moreover, the United States can afford to make exceptions according to its interests, as in the case of Pakistan, known to be a WMD proliferator. But it is also entirely possible that the idea will fail to define a new international society and that the United States will have to exercise power alone rather than benefiting from the cooperation of allies who share its ideas intersubjectively. And, yet, even in such a case, Europeans must take the idea of “rogue states” into account in their international relations until they accept it, defeat the idea outright, or the United States decides to abandon it.

The constructivist focus on ideas is an attractive way of tackling the “rogue state” issue and the struggle to define international society. It allows for an international society based on shared ideas even though the essence of the problem suggests that there is variation in state behavior and a prominent role for agency. Constructivism has not yet fully addressed the second two questions posed in the introduction to this essay concerning whether international society can be exclusionary or who excludes. Theories such as Wendt’s imply that international society is encompassing; other theories explore variation in norm adherence or compliance. But, as discussed, this variation is not quite the same as true exclusivity or normative contestation. The next section describes how liberal international relations theory contributes to an understanding of the “rogue state” debate, before discussing how these disparate elements might be synthesized in future research.

Liberalism

There are two features of the “rogue state” phenomenon that evoke liberal international relations theory. First, the very idea of a “rogue state” implies some dichotomy between the group of “normal” states and the “rogues.” Second, many European policymakers have dissented, suggesting multiple visions of how international society comes to be defined. Liberalism has a long and somewhat disjointed history within international relations theory and has often been stigmatized by its old association with the utopianism of the interwar period (see Carr 1964). But modern liberal theory is a distinct alternative to realism and social constructivism insofar as it focuses on the preferences and varying domestic properties of individual states.
Liberalism is often associated with the literature on the democratic peace, which posits that liberal democracies have made a separate peace based on Kantian principles. This separate peace can be thought of as one incarnation of an international society based on a limited set of shared ideas, or bounded intersubjectivity. Indeed, Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001:302) note at the end of their study of the Kantian peace that “some states remain outside the Kantian system and can be dangerous.” The Kantian peace contains some transnational elements such as trade and international organizations, but domestic politics lie at its core. Michael Doyle (1986), who revived the study of Kantian philosophy in international relations scholarship, emphasizes the specific substantive content of liberalism as a compact between citizens and the state. Hence, in international relations:

liberal states assume that nonliberal states, which do not rest on free consent, are not just. Because nonliberal governments are in a state of aggression with their own people, their foreign relations become for liberal governments deeply suspect. In short, fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity. (Doyle 1986:1161; see also Owen 1997)

This statement is a little too strong for the “rogue state” question given that the United States certainly has not branded all nonliberal states as “rogues.” But this theory does keep some states beyond the boundaries of “normal” international relations based on ideas, suggesting that international society can be exclusionary. It may even imply that two international societies can exist at the same time. Interestingly along these lines, we note the emphasis on regime type in the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy (see also Jervis 2003:366–369). Only certain WMD proliferators or supporters of terrorism are singled out in the Strategy (Bush 2002:14): those that “brutalize their own people” and “reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands” (see also Lake 1994:46).

Doyle’s vision of a separate liberal peace is based mostly on a just, rights-based connection between state and people, not necessarily other forms of state behavior related to international security. Furthermore, Doyle does not address hegemony or power relations within the liberal zone, thus providing little guidance for the second puzzle concerning differing conceptions of international society. The “rogue state” question has highlighted discord among the liberal democracies, though the democratic peace itself appears in little danger of shattering. The more recent democratic peace literature (Russett and Oneal 2001:300–305) has begun to address the question of hegemony and multilateralism, though it has not explored competing definitions of international society.

Pulling back slightly from the substantive content of liberalism, we can take liberalism more generally to mean a state-level focus on domestic variation and preferences. In this vein, Andrew Moravcsik (1997) has articulated a version of liberalism based on domestic preferences. Moravcsik (1997:525) argues that one form that liberal international relations theory could take is “ideational liberalism,” in which domestic identities and values determine state preferences. His theory, however, does not adequately specify where state preferences come from and is too quick to dismiss elite ideas. As Ikenberry (2003:539) points out, “the United States is so powerful that the ideologies and policy views of a few key decision makers in Washington can have a huge impact on the global order.”

But Moravcsik’s focus on domestic politics, purposive state action, and variation in state preferences is an important indictment of system-level approaches. Liberalism is well placed to tackle the question of competing visions of international society—or variation in state norm entrepreneurship. In the period of the “rogue state” debate and the Iraq crisis, alternative conceptions of international society have arisen. Some countries, especially in Europe, seek to define an alternative
international society based on principles of multilateralism and international organizations. Such an international society could be exclusionary, as it arguably proved in the 1991 Gulf War. The war on terrorism could fit into this framework but would not necessarily define it. Kagan (2003:39–42, 60) alludes to this alternative multilateral vision for international society, claiming that it is natural for weaker states to want to restrain stronger ones through international law. Although power disparities matter, both the US and European conceptions of international society are viable “social purposes,” to use Ruggie’s language. Liberalism’s ability to allow for subsets of states would also help explain the extent of international society.

A liberal approach would also be able to address head-on claims that the “rogue state” idea and some of its stranger policy outcomes—such as the Helms-Burton or Iran–Libya Sanctions Acts, which sparked a major US–EU trade dispute—resulted from domestic interest group pressure. Furthermore, in the lead-up to the Iraq War, variation in domestic political pressures played a significant role in European foreign policy. Several countries, including France and Germany, were concerned about domestic unrest given their large Muslim minority populations (Gordon and Shapiro 2004:90). And public opinion put pressure on European leaders, though to differing degrees. Gordon and Shapiro (2004:145) argue that French President Jacques Chirac could not resist “the opportunity to lead a unified French public opinion, including the Muslim population, and European and world opinion,” whereas British Prime Minister Tony Blair supported the United States but sought a second UN resolution for political cover. Additionally, as Gordon and Shapiro (2004:175) note, there was significant variation even within Europe over support for the war, with a majority of European countries supporting the United States.

Like the other theories, liberalism has its limitations. Doyle’s approach focuses on liberalism as an ideology, but it leaves power and ideas about other security issues largely unexplored. Neoliberal institutionalists, like Robert Keohane (1984), do examine how state preferences are aggregated to form international institutions, which may in turn induce cooperation even amid anarchy. Hegemons have a role to play in the development and maintenance of stable institutions that might otherwise never overcome the barriers of anarchy (Lake 1993) and can persist even after the hegemon’s decline (Keohane 1984). Keohane (1984:26) argues that “the United States shaped the system as much as the system shaped it.” The neoliberal institutional approach shows how order can emerge from anarchy through agent- or state-driven institution building.

The Iraq confrontation, however, raises questions about the role of institutions such as the United Nations and the preferences of states with enough power to circumvent those institutions. US hegemony means that the United States can afford to pursue its vision of international society, by force if necessary. In the long term, this strategy may have damaged US relations with its allies in significant ways. As Ikenberry (2001) argues (echoing Ruggie), the post-World War II international society had a distinctly US character, but its explicit functioning through international institutions made the role of US power more palatable. The dispute over “rogue states” even before September 11 and the war in Iraq left the United States appearing to undermine institutions, even as it tried to persuade Europeans to strengthen their commitment to containing “rogues.” Whether or not the United States will succeed in “socializing” other countries to its criteria for membership in international society remains to be seen. As Ikenberry (2001) has suggested, hegemons must be careful about how they wield their power and may benefit from binding themselves through institutions. But the “rogue state” debate and the Iraq war demonstrate that power can be put in the service of many different ideas.

Liberalism is useful as a lens through which to view “rogue states” insofar as it provides boundaries for shared ideas and values and focuses attention on the state level to account for the origins and limits of international society. Although it has yet to address fully the final question posed in the introduction, about who gets to
decide on exclusion from international society, its state-level approach is potentially suitable for addressing that question. Let us turn in the final section of this essay to a discussion of how liberal and constructivist theories, combined with a role for power, might engage each other in future research.

**Future Research: The State as Norm Entrepreneur?**

Table 1 summarizes the answers each major international relations theory gives to the three questions posed in the introduction. These answers do not, of course, reflect every study within each approach, but they refer to how the approaches would in general answer the questions. As shown, liberalism and constructivism provide the most interesting answers, though the question of who excludes remains largely unexplored, at least beyond institutionalism. The variety of liberalism or constructivism also matters, as shown in Table 2, which summarizes the major theories. The table is adapted from one developed by Wendt (1999:32) to outline “four sociologies of international politics.” The four sociologies revolve around two dimensions. The first distinguishes between an emphasis on material interests and resources, on the one hand, and ideas, on the other. Holistic, interest-based approaches are best represented by neorealism. Holistic, ideas-based approaches have thus far tended to be systemic or structural versions of social constructivism; indeed, Wendt locates his own work in this box. Individual, interest-based approaches are exemplified by classical realists and liberals who focus on the material bases of domestic politics. Individualistic, ideas-based approaches, which this essay argues are the most appropriate for addressing the “rogue state” question, could involve liberal approaches with a focus on ideas, keeping in mind the minimalist definition of “liberal” theory that describes variation in state motivations. Some of Ruggie’s (1998) work, particularly on “embedded liberalism,” arguably fits into this quadrant, as does work on domestic norms and identity. In principle, work that describes ideationally based, unit-level accounts of realist behavior—such as Alastair Iain Johnston’s (1995) work on “cultural realism”—could also be placed in this box.

**Table 1. Summary of Theories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>International Society?</th>
<th>Exclusionary?</th>
<th>Who Excludes?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>No (except some classical realists)</td>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Constructivism</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (though perhaps with variation in norm adherence)</td>
<td>Not yet clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not yet clear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table adapted from Wendt (1999:32).

**Table 2. Major International Relations Theories**

| Interest Based | Ideas Based                     |
|----------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Holism         | Neorealism                     | Systemic constructivism    |
| Individualism  | Classical and domestic-based realism; material liberalism | Ideational liberalism?    |
|                |                                | Individualistic constructivism? |
|                |                                | Cultural realism?          |
There remains more work to do, however, with regard to individualistic, ideas-based approaches. Moreover, although material capabilities are not the most useful predictors of state behavior in the case of the “rogue-state” debate, power remains an important factor in determining the fate of ideas. The argument made in this essay is that, in order to adequately specify the salient substantive issues defining a bounded international society, the ideas originating in powerful states must be treated systematically as must the limits of such ideas. This argument suggests that a framework for understanding the “rogue state” debate requires a synthesis of ideas, the power considerations that describe the origins and spread of these ideas, and variations in both state preferences and purposes and in the acceptance of new ideas as the basis of order. Building on Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) model of norm development, we can imagine the state acting as a norm entrepreneur, even as we must also consider how the ideas originating within states may or may not become intersubjective norms as they propagate out from the state. Future research should push existing points of tangency between power, ideas, and state-level variation even further by examining (1) the origins of ideas within states; (2) processes of diffusion or imposition of ideas, taking power into account; and (3) variation in receptivity to new ideas, defining the boundaries of intersubjectivity.

**Future Research on Ideas and the State**

If we are to understand how states might become norm entrepreneurs, more research on how ideas become salient within states and shape state preferences—which can vary—will be crucial. An approach at the intersection of states and ideas, drawing on both liberalism and constructivism, is a promising avenue for future research, (see also Moravcsik 1997:539).

Certainly some scholars have already begun to move in this direction. Consider those mentioned above who are working on domestic norms and identity. Additionally, in terms of bounded subsets of states that share a common set of ideas, there are important connections between the democratic peace literature and the literature on security communities (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998). Thomas Risse-Kappan’s (1995) study of NATO and cooperation among democracies calls for liberalism and the community of democracies to be understood in terms of shared ideas and norms among the Atlantic allies and demonstrates the effect that the European powers had on US policy even during the Cold War (see also Owen 1997). Indeed, in a later essay (Risse-Kappan 1996:365), he explicitly calls his mode of analysis “a liberal constructivist approach.”

Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein (2002) employ what they call an eclectic theoretical approach, drawing on constructivism but also acknowledging power and the limits of collective identity, in asking why the United States built a multilateral organization for its postwar alliance in Europe but pursued bilateral alliances in Asia.

More research on the sources of ideas within the state itself would push this program further. Keith Darden’s (forthcoming:chapter 2) “pragmatist” theory argues that it is crucial to specify whose ideas matter within the state because ideas aggregate from the bottom up, first from individuals and then within the state and finally to the international level. Whose causal ideas matter depends on the degree to which the government is accountable and controls information. Domestic politics and the relative power of actors determine how ideas lead to different national preferences regarding international institutional arrangements.

The ideas of state or governmental elites themselves also merit significant attention. James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul’s (2003) study of US policy toward Russia in the post-Cold War era argues that different US administrations have taken markedly different approaches toward Russia. Their argument explicitly notes the
role of individuals’ ideas in shaping the purpose of US policy toward Russia. Given
the central, agenda-setting role of executive leadership even within a highly frag-
mented state such as the United States (Krasner 1978:11; Russett 1990:chapter 4;
Howell 2003:103–106), research on the sources and impact of elite ideas concern-
ing how to employ power (building on earlier work such as George 1969) might
prove useful, especially in explaining variation in how states act as agents of norm-
building. Such work need not close off the possibility that nonstate or societal actors
might also try to influence elites. The concept of the state, or government elites, as
norm entrepreneurs should complement existing studies of nonstate actors.

The “rogue state” case and the war in Iraq provide an impetus for this kind of
research. Gordon and Shapiro (2004:161) argue that elite leadership played a vital
role in the Iraq crisis. Whereas domestic political considerations may have influenced
French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Brit-
ain’s Tony Blair supported the United States in defiance of British public opinion. Ivo
Daalder and James Lindsey (2003) have proposed that George W. Bush personally
led a revolution in US foreign policy. Although it is still too early to understand the
genesis of the war with all the tools of empirical analysis, it seems clear that elite
ideas—rather than simply preferences induced by material power—played an im-
portant role in the decision to attack Iraq. The war itself is too costly to dismiss as
driven purely by material interests; furthermore, journalistic evidence suggests a
strong ideational component to the administration’s Iraq policy stemming from a
small inner circle of foreign policy elites (see Keller 2002; Beaumont et al. 2003; for a
more skeptical view, see Economist 2003). Several in this group were members of the
George H.W. Bush administration and were instrumental in the initial development of
the “rogue state” idea. Robert Jervis (2003:366) has argued that the Bush Doctrine
itself was a product of both “idiosyncratic and structural factors.” Even within the
“rogue state” framework, North Korea and Iran arguably present more pressing
threats. Yet, the United States chose to attack Iraq, prompting commentators such as
Thomas Friedman (2002) and even Richard Haass (2003), Bush’s director of the
State Department Policy Planning Staff during the lead-up to the war, to contend that
the invasion was a “war of choice.”

Research on elite ideas need not concentrate only on principled beliefs or beliefs
traditionally associated with the substantive content of liberalism such as free trade
or democratic institutions (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001:403 also make this point).
A promising area is the study of causal ideas, or “beliefs about cause-effect rela-
tionships which derive authority from the shared consensus of recognized elites”
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993:10). Scholars have linked causal ideas about how to
achieve goals to observable—and varying—behavior in the international arena
(McNamara 1999; Darden forthcoming).

Empirically, causal beliefs may have played an important role in the transatlantic
split over both “rogue states” and how to confront Iraq. As discussed earlier, a
remarkable feature of the “rogue state” concept is its longevity in US domestic
politics, spanning several administrations. This continuity suggests that the differ-
ences in the administrations’ approaches to “rogues” are differences of means and
limits rather than ends. The Clinton administration was much more willing—and
indeed sought—to build a consensus for its “rogue state” policy. But on a funda-
mental level the United States has consistently embraced a harder-line approach
whereas the Europeans have sought to use the tools of engagement with “rogues,”
suggesting differences in beliefs about how to confront such threats.

It is possible to view the transatlantic split over the Iraq war as a clash of causal
beliefs. Although the operational link between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s
regime was dubious, it seems clear that key US policymakers regarded regime
change in Iraq—in effect, eliminating a “rogue state” and remaking it into a com-
pliant member of a US-defined international society—as the best way to address
the threats facing the United States and its allies. The administration was quite
willing to pursue this belief alone. Most US allies recognized the threat from Iraq, but they did not see regime change in Iraq as the right way to address the threat, preferring instead to pursue inspections through the United Nations. As Gordon and Shapiro (2004:146) note, even though French President Chirac may have had domestic reasons to oppose the United States, France “genuinely thought the war was a bad idea and worried that a Western occupation of Iraq could turn into a quagmire that would serve as a recruiting tool for al Qaeda.” Notably, as mentioned earlier, even some realists argued that containment and deterrence would be preferable strategies for confronting Saddam (Mearsheimer and Walt 2003a, 2003b). A dispute over causal beliefs—how best to meet terrorist and WMD threats—thus threatened to undermine shared ideas about the threats themselves. Kagan (2003:60) hints at this possibility when he describes how Europeans apply their own post-World War II multilateralism “with the evangelic zeal of converts,” preferring engagement strategies even with “rogues.” But even though France and Germany could make things harder for the United States, they could not stop the invasion. Far from being irrelevant, power played a central role in the crisis.

Future Research on Power and the Spread of Ideas

Even though research linking states and ideas may provide an important way forward, power deserves a central place on the agenda for future research. How do resources, either material or ideational, affect an actor’s capacity to be an effective and successful norm entrepreneur and to convince other actors to accept a new idea as the basis for membership in international society? Of course, power has always received the lion’s share of attention in international relations scholarship, but future research should concentrate on different expressions of power. Power may stem from material capabilities, as realists have long argued, but how powerful states employ or frame their power often depends on ideas.

Studies of hegemony are important building blocks. In addition to the literature on institutions and hegemony, some scholars draw on the work of Antonio Gramsci to explore hegemonic dominance and have included ideational and cultural factors in their research (Cox 1987; see also Russett 1985:228–230 for a discussion). Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990; see also Ikenberry 2001) argue that periods after major wars have been critical times for hegemons to socialize other states to their vision of order.

But much more work remains to be done on the relationship between power and ideas or, as Ruggie puts it, “social purpose.” In their recent reconceptualization of power, Barnett and Duvall (2005:40) lament that those crafting theoretical responses to realism—including liberals and constructivists—have deliberately sought to “distance themselves” from power and its causal influence rather than embracing or redefining the concept of power. They propose a fourfold typology of power, which, either directly or through more diffuse processes, takes the form of control over others’ actions or the power to define actors constitutively. These distinctions are useful in the “rogue state” case, though it is important to keep the “bound- edness” of intersubjectivity in mind. The US attempt to define a class of actors called “rogue states” may represent a way to exercise what Barnett and Duvall (2005:52–53) call “structural power,” in which an actor seeks to define “what kinds of social beings actors are.” The problem, of course, is that not all those within the “non-rogue” community agree, and powerful states have resisted the designation.

The power processes highlighted by Barnett and Duvall suggest that to complement studies of the sources of ideas, another important avenue for future research concerns how an idea that originates in one country is transmitted or diffused to another group of states. In addition to Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) model of the norm “life cycle,” which includes a stage for a norm to “cascade,” the epistemic communities’ literature has explored the diffusion of knowledge (see, for example, Hall 1989; Adler 1992).
But there is room for further exploration of the role of power in ideational and normative change. Including the role of power would seem to be a natural extension of models of “norm entrepreneurship.” However a potential norm originates (even if it is simply an idea initially accepted by only one state), its fate may be profoundly shaped by a powerful sponsor. One could imagine an existing international society based on a set of boundedly intersubjective ideas but facing the challenge of a new set of ideas that seeks to redefine the terms of the particular international society. Shifts in power within the international system as a whole could have important effects on such redefinitions as arguably happened within the society of Western democratic states after the collapse of the Soviet threat.

Yet, even if the “rogue state” label encounters resistance, its very use may represent an exercise of a different kind of power. An alternative conception of power in Barnett and Duvall’s (2005:55–57) typology is “productive power,” which seeks to define actors constitutively (as structural power does) through less direct practices, such as the diffusion of knowledge or discourse. Barnett and Duvall (2005:56) specifically mention the term “rogue” as one in a series of “categories of classification” that are manifestations of “productive power.” To see how the idea of a “rogue state” diffused from the United States to other countries, consider, for example, the path of the phrase “rogue state” through the world media. Figure 2 charts the number of uses of the phrase “rogue state” or “rogue states”—or its local translation—in two leading daily newspapers each from the United States, Britain, France, and Germany.3

Note: Count includes instances of “rogue state” and “rogue states” in the US and UK; “Etat voyou” and “Etats voyous” in France; and “Schurkenstaat” and “Schurkenstaaten” in Germany. Sources counted via LexisNexis except where noted (see footnote 3 for a list of sources and exceptions in dates of coverage). Coverage begins in 1990, except for Germany where coverage begins in 1993. As with the Congressional Record search, the 2001 count runs through September 10. The frequency for 2001 is calculated by dividing the number of instances through September 10 by the proportion of the year that had elapsed.


But there is room for further exploration of the role of power in ideational and normative change. Including the role of power would seem to be a natural extension of models of “norm entrepreneurship.” However a potential norm originates (even if it is simply an idea initially accepted by only one state), its fate may be profoundly shaped by a powerful sponsor. One could imagine an existing international society based on a set of boundedly intersubjective ideas but facing the challenge of a new set of ideas that seeks to redefine the terms of the particular international society. Shifts in power within the international system as a whole could have important effects on such redefinitions as arguably happened within the society of Western democratic states after the collapse of the Soviet threat.

Yet, even if the “rogue state” label encounters resistance, its very use may represent an exercise of a different kind of power. An alternative conception of power in Barnett and Duvall’s (2005:55–57) typology is “productive power,” which seeks to define actors constitutively (as structural power does) through less direct practices, such as the diffusion of knowledge or discourse. Barnett and Duvall (2005:56) specifically mention the term “rogue” as one in a series of “categories of classification” that are manifestations of “productive power.” To see how the idea of a “rogue state” diffused from the United States to other countries, consider, for example, the path of the phrase “rogue state” through the world media. Figure 2 charts the number of uses of the phrase “rogue state” or “rogue states”—or its local translation—in two leading daily newspapers each from the United States, Britain, France, and Germany.3

Note: Count includes instances of “rogue state” and “rogue states” in the US and UK; “Etat voyou” and “Etats voyous” in France; and “Schurkenstaat” and “Schurkenstaaten” in Germany. Sources counted via LexisNexis except where noted (see footnote 3 for a list of sources and exceptions in dates of coverage). Coverage begins in 1990, except for Germany where coverage begins in 1993. As with the Congressional Record search, the 2001 count runs through September 10. The frequency for 2001 is calculated by dividing the number of instances through September 10 by the proportion of the year that had elapsed.


Yet, even if the “rogue state” label encounters resistance, its very use may represent an exercise of a different kind of power. An alternative conception of power in Barnett and Duvall’s (2005:55–57) typology is “productive power,” which seeks to define actors constitutively (as structural power does) through less direct practices, such as the diffusion of knowledge or discourse. Barnett and Duvall (2005:56) specifically mention the term “rogue” as one in a series of “categories of classification” that are manifestations of “productive power.” To see how the idea of a “rogue state” diffused from the United States to other countries, consider, for example, the path of the phrase “rogue state” through the world media. Figure 2 charts the number of uses of the phrase “rogue state” or “rogue states”—or its local translation—in two leading daily newspapers each from the United States, Britain, France, and Germany.3

3The US search included the New York Times and the Washington Post; for Britain, the Financial Times and The Guardian; for Germany, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Suddeutsche Zeitung; and for France, Le Monde and Le Figaro. Except for the German newspapers, the search covered the period from January 1, 1990 to September 10, 2001 because the phrase “rogue state” only really hit the US mainstream in 1990 and because here we are primarily concerned with the origins and initial diffusion of the term. The search was conducted via LexisNexis, supplemented by a search of the Le Figaro website (http://www.lefigaro.fr) because LexisNexis coverage of Le Figaro begins in 1997. Data points for Germany were not included for 1990–1992 because the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung electronic coverage begins in 1993 and the Suddeutsche Zeitung in 1991. But given the dearth of mentions in the French papers prior to 1995 and in the Suddeutsche Zeitung in 1991 and 1992, it seems likely that there would be very few mentions in Germany between 1990 and 1993. The author is grateful to Rafaela Dancygier for help with the German search.
The number of hits for Britain, Germany, and France lags behind the United States totals. Mentions in the British press—Britain being the closest ally of the United States and a frequent military supporter of US operations against Iraq in the 1990s—track fairly closely with those in the United States, lagging behind by about a year. But Germany, and especially France, hardly register any mentions at all until 1996 (Germany) and 1998 (France). Germany had caught up with and even surpassed the United States by 2001. In German and French news articles, the phrase often appears in quotation marks or is followed by the English translation “rogue state.” Many articles are highly critical of the phrase, and many refer to the phrase as a US term. But even though Rouleau, as was mentioned earlier, could claim in 1995 that there was no French equivalent to “rogue states,” by the end of the decade the phrase had gained a foothold in the diplomatic lexicon of these European countries. Like it or not, Europeans had to at least consider the possibility of a “rogue state,” even as they continued to resist its legitimacy. More work by scholars who incorporate the idea of communicative action, including the role of power in shaping discourse, would be useful in addressing this type of diffusion (see, for example, Campbell 1998; Risse 2000).

**Future Research on Receptivity to Ideas**

That even a powerful state’s efforts at norm entrepreneurship will be successful is not, however, preordained (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:895). Whether ideas become intersubjectively shared, and how far they are shared, are empirical questions. Theoretically, it is possible that other states might sign on to a new idea proposed by a powerful state who, in turn, could succeed in being its own international “norm entrepreneur” or alternatively that same idea may not become entrenched and an expenditure of power will be necessary to sustain its relevance. These possibilities suggest that a final avenue for future research is the exploration of normative contestation and the conditions under which other states are receptive to the ideas of the powerful. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:897) also argue, “in constructing their frames, norm entrepreneurs face firmly embedded alternative norms and frames that create alternative perceptions of both appropriateness and interest.” Some states may subscribe to an idea for social reasons (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:902–904 for a review of several socialization mechanisms, such as praise, censure, sanctions, or the desire for conformity) or because the ideas are initially in their interests. But other states may resist. The idea may not become intersubjective at all and may have to be coercively imposed on weaker states, as Elizabeth Kier and Jonathan Mercer (1996:80) note in the context of conventions. Such foisted conventions are likely to be much more fragile and divisive, however, as has certainly occurred in the “rogue state” case.

To explore these concepts further (including at the level of the fundamental conflict over using norms to define society rather than simply variation in adherence), it would be useful to move beyond hegemonic dominance to explore ideational contestation between equal powers or resistance to hegemonic dominance by smaller but still relatively powerful actors. When other powers do not accept one power’s ability to define international society, normative or definitional battles may result. Models of normative contestation that incorporate a role for power would help explain which norms or ideas “win” or become salient. Ian Hurd’s (2005) exploration of how states struggle over how to define, redefine, and interpret the legitimacy of institutions such as the United Nations is a recent example, although he is more concerned with how weaker states (like Libya) influence such struggles. Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:293) argue that there are particular conditions under which hegemonic socialization will be successful. If the vision of hegemonic elites is “rebuffed,” a reworking or compromise may be required. Refusal to engage in such rethinking may limit the number of states that accept the new order,
hampering its effectiveness. Recognition of such limits and of the efficacy of multilateral arrangements may have driven the United States, at least in the 1990s, to try to convince other major powers to subscribe to its notion of “rogues” even in the face of resistance. The Bush administration has been much less willing to accommodate the resistance of allies, but, in turn, arguably has paid a price in having to accept a smaller “coalition of the willing” in Iraq. As Jervis (2003:388) has pointed out, Europe is unlikely to balance the United States militarily, but it could provide strong political opposition and, thus, the “the fate of the American design for world order lies in the hands of its allies.” Whatever the mechanisms that account for acceptance of new bases of order, theories should allow for the possibility that these processes do not operate uniformly and that ideas may only spread to a limited number of states, resulting in “bounded intersubjectivity.”

None of these theories adequately specifies a microprocess behind the idea of the “rogue state” and the actual exclusion of some states from international society. Indeed, this section of the essay has indicated that much work remains to be done on the role of the state as the originator of new ideas, on variation in how states might act as agents of normative change, and on the role of power and variation in responses to it in determining the extent to which such ideas become boundedly intersubjective. Constructivists who employ a state-level or individual approach, with their emphasis on intersubjectivity and ideas as causal factors, might fruitfully collaborate with liberals focusing on variation in state purposes and subsets of states to tackle the problem of defining international society and identifying the limits of shared ideas. Any such theorizing must, however, incorporate a role for power.

Conclusion

This essay has argued that international relations theorists should be interested in the question of whether “rogue states” exist outside the boundaries of international society and how states contest the definition or redefinition of international society. So-called rogues are still part of the international system, but even a cursory examination of their recent history suggests, on a commonsense level, that they do not have a “normal” role in international relations. As the dominant power in the system, the United States is responsible for this status. But the designation was not inevitable. International relations theories that focus only on US material power or simply on ideas within the United States are indeterminate. Only by understanding how the United States chooses to wield its power and how other powers respond, can we understand the evolving basis of a bounded international society. Whether “rogue states” status will change or become entrenched depends on the “rogues” own behavior and, should it continue unchanged, on the degree to which other states embrace the “rogue state” formulation.

Libya’s admission in 2003 that it had a clandestine WMD program that it planned to give up, and Muammar el-Qaddafi’s apparent wish for some time to come back into the international fold, may be evidence that “rogue” behavior can change without regime change (see Anderson 2003; Sanger and Miller 2003). The role of “rogue state” rhetoric and the Iraq war in Libya’s shift remain to be evaluated. Hurd’s (2005) recent study of Libya’s strategic manipulation of the United Nation’s role as a legitimate institution of liberal internationalism is an important cautionary tale. Even if there is widespread agreement among great powers (as there was in the Libyan case) on how to treat a specific “rogue,” weaker powers can still undermine the rhetorical and symbolic power of punishment regimes. Beyond contestation within institutions like the United Nations, when great powers disagree about the very definition of “rogue states” (which is arguably a debate over the very definition of international society and who gets to define it), weak powers have even more room to exploit differences among great powers. With the ability of the United States to use military power against “rogues” now constrained by the
practical difficulties of postwar Iraq, the United States seems more willing to back European approaches to problems such as Iran’s nuclear program, whereas the European Union has taken a harder line on Iran itself.

The question of how to deal with a “rogue state” also needs reviving. The debate over the effectiveness of coercive sanctions versus economic and international political engagement, prominent in the late 1990s, has been lost amid the war in Iraq, but it is returning to the fore as the Iranian nuclear issue regains a central place on the international agenda. A theoretical framework for the emergence of a norm that excludes “rogue states” from international society may provide clues to future policy, but it could, in turn, benefit from an understanding of whether exclusion from international society actually works as a strategy to reform “rogue” behavior or whether inclusion and engagement are better options.

The US strategy of trying to impose its vision of international society unilaterally on its allies and its enemies alike may yet backfire. But for now, all states must live, however uncomfortably, with the effects of a US policy that makes WMD proliferation and terrorism the relevant criteria for inclusion in what can be an exclusionary international society.

References

BUZAN, BARRY. (1993) From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and
CAPRIOLI, MARY, AND PETER F. TRUMBORE. (2003) Identifying “Rogue” States and Testing Their
CARR, EDWARD H. (1964) The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International
CHRISTENSEN, THOMAS J. (1996) Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-
CHRISTENSEN, THOMAS J., AND JACK SNYDER. (1990) Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting
White House.
York: Columbia University Press.
DARDEN, KEITH. (Forthcoming) Economic Liberalism and the Formation of International Institutions among
DEUTSCH, KARL W., SIDNEY A. BURRELL, ROBERT A. KANN, MAURICE LEE JR., MARTIN LICHTERMAN,
RAYMOND E. LINDGREN, FRANCIS L. LOEWENHEIM, AND RICHARD W. VAN WAGENEN. (1957) Po-
litical Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical
DOYLE, MICHAEL W. (1986) Liberalism and World Politics. American Political Science Review 80:
1151–1169.
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
EIZENSTAT, STUART. (1997) Remarks before the US House of Representatives, Ways and Means Trade
Subcommittee, October 23. Available at http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/971023_
eizen_house.html.
Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Si-
FINNEMORE, MARTHA, AND KATHRYN SIKKINK. (1998) International Norm Dynamics and Political
Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics. Annual Review of Political Science
4:391–416.
Framework. In Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, edited by Judith


